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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge
 Shannon J. Mandel appeals the final judgment of the 
District Court entered on July 25, 2011, following the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of defendant M&Q Packaging 
Corporation.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court with respect to the retaliation 
claims, the PHRA claims, and the Title VII sex discrimination 
claims.  We will reverse the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the Title VII hostile work environment 
and constructive discharge claims and remand the case for 
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
: 
 
I.  
 A.  Factual Background 
BACKGROUND 
 On October 25, 1996, Shannon J. Mandel was hired as 
an Inside Sales and Customer Relations Coordinator by M&Q 
Packaging Corporation (M&Q), which manufactures and sells 
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packaging film.  Mandel claimed that, throughout her 
employment from October 25, 1996, to May 23, 2007, she 
was sexually harassed and discriminated against by male 
managers, supervisors, and owners in alleged incidents such 
as being referred to as “woman,” “darling,” “the woman,” 
“fluffy,” “missy,” “hon,” and “toots”; having her body, 
clothing, and physical appearance commented on; being told 
that she was “foolish not to use [her] assets”; being told by 
Systems Manager David Benetz, when she asked for 
directions to a meeting at corporate headquarters, that “[f]or 
you . . . the meeting will start at my house tonight and we will 
conclude our part of it tomorrow morning – maybe . . . we 
may need to postpone the meeting with everyone else a few 
hours to finish up . . .”; being told by Quality Manager Harold 
Brenneman that he fantasized about her while he was having 
sex with his wife; being told in a review by Managing 
Director (and later President & COO) Michael Schmal that 
she was “too female” and “too emotional”; being solicited for 
dates by Vice President of Sales Curt Rubenstein even after 
she told him she was not interested; being told to clean the 
bathroom and make coffee when male employees were not 
asked to perform such tasks; and being paid less and given 
less vacation time than a male manager.   
 
 Mandel reported to George Schmidt from October 25, 
1996, until 1998 or 1999, to Vice President Jack Menges until 
February of 2006, and finally to Schmal until May 23, 2007.  
Mandel contends that Schmal, Department Manager Larry 
Dahm, Plant Manager Ernest Bachert, and Human Resources 
Manager Jack Conway also reported to Menges during the 
same time period and were her peers.  Neither Menges nor 
Schmidt ever harassed Mendel.   
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 On April 6, 2007, during a meeting regarding sample 
orders, Bachert became angry, repeatedly called Mandel a 
“bitch,” and screamed “shut the fuck up.”  Bachert had 
previously referred to Mandel as a “bitch,” both in and out of 
her presence.  As a result of the meeting, Mandel resigned on 
May 23, 2007, by submitting a letter with two weeks’ notice 
to Schmal.  When Mandel resigned from M&Q, she accepted 
a position with Yuengling.   
 
 In her resignation letter, Mandel did not complain of 
harassment or discrimination, apparently because she was 
concerned she would be denied her vacation time.  She did, 
however, refer to the Employee Handbook.  The Employee 
Handbook included an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Policy, which informed employees that they should contact 
the personnel manager—in this case, Conway—if  they felt 
they were being discriminated against.  The Employee 
Handbook also included an Open Door policy, which directed 
employees to discuss any issues first with their supervisor and 
then with the personnel manager.  Mandel testified in her 
deposition that she understood the policies in the Employee 
Handbook but felt uncomfortable going to Conway or Schmal 
with her complaints.  Conway testified in his deposition that 
other than giving each employee a copy of the Employee 
Handbook, there was no training regarding discrimination or 
sexual harassment.   
 
 Although Mandel complained to Schmidt about being 
told to make coffee, she did not complain to her supervisors 
about other alleged incidents of harassment or discrimination.  
Mandel occasionally used profanity and sent emails 
containing sexual humor.  Mandel also called Bachert “gay” 
on a few occasions, apparently as a joke in reference to 
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jealous husbands who claimed Bachert made advances to 
their wives.  Mandel was never disciplined during her 
employment with M&Q.   
 
 B.  Procedural History 
 Mandel completed Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) questionnaires (dated July 17, 2007), 
which were received by the EEOC on September 13, 2007.  
On the questionnaires, Mandel checked boxes indicating “I 
want to file a charge.”  The EEOC processed the forms and 
issued a Charge of Discrimination (Charge) on December 14, 
2007.  That same day, Mandel requested that the Charge be 
dual filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission (PHRC).  On October 21, 2008, the EEOC 
issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, indicating “the 
EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained 
establishes violations of the statutes” and informing Mandel 
of her right to sue within 90 days of receipt.   
 
 On January 9, 2009, Mandel filed a Complaint against 
M&Q, alleging gender-based discrimination, sexual 
harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Counts I 
and II), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq. (Count III), as well as 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in violation of 
Pennsylvania law (Count IV).   
 
 On August 18, 2009, the District Court partially 
granted M&Q’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  The District Court found that Mandel had failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies because she indicated on 
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the EEOC questionnaires that she did not take action for fear 
of reprisal and thus any claim of retaliation was not 
encompassed in the EEOC Charge.  The District Court also 
found that the allegations did not constitute the type of 
“clearly disparate and ultra extreme conduct” actionable 
under an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.  
The District Court, therefore, dismissed Counts I, II, and III 
to the extent they alleged claims of retaliation and dismissed 
Count IV in its entirety.   
 
 On July 25, 2011, the District Court granted M&Q’s 
motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims.  The 
District Court excluded evidence of certain alleged incidents 
because Mandel did not testify to them in her deposition, 
although she discussed them in her EEOC questionnaires.  
The District Court found all of Mandel’s claims under the 
PHRA time barred, as well as all claims under Title VII for 
incidents that occurred prior to November 17, 2006.  The 
District Court then considered the remaining incidents on the 
merits and granted summary judgment in favor of M&Q.   
 
 Mandel appealed, and the EEOC filed an amicus brief.  
II. 
 A.  Motion to Dismiss 
DISCUSSION 
 Mandel argues that the District Court erred in granting 
M&Q’s motion to dismiss all claims of retaliation.  We 
exercise plenary review of an order granting a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).  Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 779 (3d Cir. 
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2010).  We accept all factual allegations as true and construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Id.   
 
 A plaintiff “must exhaust all required administrative 
remedies before bringing a claim for judicial relief.”  
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997).  To 
bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC and procure a notice of the 
right to sue.  See id. at 1020-21.  The same is required to 
bring a claim under the PHRA.  Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 
460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Claims under the 
PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title VII claims.”).  
“[T]he parameters of the civil action in the district court are 
defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can 
reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of 
discrimination, including new acts which occurred during the 
pendency of proceedings before the [EEOC].”  Ostapowicz v. 
Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398-99 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(citations omitted).  A plaintiff’s claim must thus fall “fairly 
within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the 
investigation arising therefrom.”  Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 
1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996).     
 
Mandel contends, as she did before the District Court, 
that she was constructively discharged due to intolerable 
work conditions after she complained of sex discrimination 
and sexual harassment.  The District Court found that the 
retaliation claims were not within the scope of the Charge, 
explaining that although there was “substantial factual 
overlap” between the Charge and the Complaint, they 
contradicted each other on the facts supporting the retaliation 
claims.  In particular, the District Court noted: 
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Plaintiff’s complaint alleges she 
took action by complaining to the 
general manager and suffered 
consequent reprisal.  Her EEOC 
charge indicates that she did not 
take action for fear of reprisal.  It 
cannot reasonably be expected 
that the EEOC’s investigation 
would encompass a claim of 
retaliation for engaging in 
statutorily protected activity 
where Plaintiff’s charge states that 
she refrained from activity that 
might be protected, nor is there 
any indication that a retaliation 
claim was in fact investigated. 
 
The District Court correctly concluded that the factual 
statement in support of the Charge did not encompass claims 
of retaliation.  Mandel herself concedes that the box for 
retaliation was not checked on the Charge.  Mandel urges this 
Court to construe the Charge liberally, however, because it “is 
nearly always drafted by a non-lawyer.”  “[A]n 
unsophisticated, inartfully drafted Charge” should not be 
dispositive of a plaintiff’s rights.  Such an argument is inapt 
here because Mandel, even as a non-lawyer, could have easily 
checked the box for retaliation on the Charge but failed to do 
so.  She also failed to allege any retaliatory conduct in the 
Charge.  When asked in the questionnaires whether she had 
reported the alleged harassment to her employer, she 
responded “no” and again failed to check the box for 
retaliation.  Because Mandel failed to exhaust her remedies 
for any claims of retaliation, we will affirm the District 
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Court’s dismissal of Counts I, II, and III to the extent that 
they allege claims of retaliation. 
 
 B.  Motion for Summary Judgment 
 Mandel appeals the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in M&Q’s favor on the PHRA claims, the Title VII 
hostile work environment claim, and the Title VII sex 
discrimination claims.  We review the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as 
the District Court.  Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 
256, 275 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).  “Summary judgment should be 
granted ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  We 
view “the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.”  Id.  
 
  1.  PHRA Claims 
 To bring suit under the PHRA, an administrative 
complaint must first be filed with the PHRC within 180 days 
of the alleged act of discrimination.  43 Pa. Cons. Stat.           
§ 959(h).  The District Court found all PHRA claims time 
barred, reasoning that more than 180 days had passed from 
Mandel’s resignation on May 23, 2007, to her cross-filing of 
a complaint with the PHRC on December 14, 2007.   
 
Mandel contends that the 180-day period should 
instead be calculated from September 13, 2007, the date on 
which the EEOC received her questionnaires.  The District 
Court rejected that argument, explaining that “the filing of a 
charge with the EEOC in itself is not sufficient to comply 
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with the PHRA.”  We have previously addressed dual filing 
with the EEOC and the PHRC, explaining: 
 
[T]he worksharing agreement 
[which divides responsibility for 
processing claims that have been 
dual filed with both the EEOC 
and the PHRC] allows a plaintiff 
to proceed in court under Title VII 
without first filing with the 
PHRC.  That, however, does not 
mean that a plaintiff can initiate 
PHRC proceedings as required by 
the PHRA merely by filing with 
the EEOC.  Whether a plaintiff 
has initiated PHRC proceedings 
under the PHRA is a state law 
issue. . . . EEOC procedures are 
not a sufficient surrogate for 
PHRC remedies.  
  
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 926-27 (3d Cir. 
1997) (footnotes omitted).  The District Court correctly 
concluded, therefore, that “the mere filling out of an EEOC 
charge information questionnaire cannot be in itself sufficient 
to comply with the PHRA.”  Moreover, as the District Court 
noted, the questionnaires did not contain any indication of 
dual filing.   Mandel further argues that the 180-day period 
should be enlarged to 300 days because Pennsylvania is a 
“deferral state.”  The District Court agreed that Pennsylvania 
is a “deferral state” and thus the statute of limitations for the 
Charge was extended to 300 days.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1) (defining time for filing a charge as 180 days, 
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enlarged to 300 days where the complainant initially 
instituted state proceedings).  The District Court properly 
rejected Mandel’s argument, however, because the 300-day 
extended statute of limitations applies only to the Charge, not 
to the PHRA filing.  See id.  We conclude that Mandel’s 
PHRA claims are time barred and thus affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in M&Q’s favor on the 
PHRA claims (Count III).   
 
  2.  Title VII Claims 
 Under Title VII, “it shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).   
 
   a.  Statute of Limitations 
 To bring suit under Title VII, a claimant in a deferral 
state, such as Pennsylvania, must first file a complaint with 
the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful 
employment practice.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).  “[D]iscrete 
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even 
when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges.”  
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 
(2002).  A discrete act in itself constitutes a separate 
actionable unlawful employment practice.  Id. at 114.  
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Discrete acts include, for example, “termination, failure to 
promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.”1
 
  Id.   
Under the continuing violation doctrine, 
discriminatory acts that are not individually actionable may 
be aggregated to make out a hostile work environment claim; 
such acts “can occur at any time so long as they are linked in 
a pattern of actions which continues into the applicable 
limitations period.”  O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 
125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105 
(explaining court may consider “entire scope of a hostile 
work environment claim . . . so long as any act contributing to 
that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time 
period”)).  A hostile work environment claim “is composed of 
a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one 
‘unlawful employment practice’” and “cannot be said to 
occur on any particular day.”  Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-17.  
To allege a continuing violation, the plaintiff must show that 
all acts which constitute the claim are part of the same 
unlawful employment practice and that at least one act falls 
within the applicable limitations period.  See Morgan, 536 
U.S. at 122; see also West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 
754-55 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining plaintiff must show that at 
                                              
1Mandel does not appeal the District Court’s correct 
determination that her claim alleging failure to promote in 
2006 was a discrete act that was time barred because it 
occurred prior to February 18, 2007 (i.e. 300 days prior to the 
filing of the Charge on December 14, 2007).  See Morgan, 
536 U.S. at 114.  The District Court later found that the 
EEOC questionnaires filed September 13, 2007 tolled the 
statute of limitations and thus her claims would not be time 
barred if they occurred after November 17, 2006.   
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least one act occurred within the filing period and that the 
harassment is “more than the occurrence of isolated or 
sporadic acts of intentional discrimination”).   
 
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), 
we had adopted from Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 
971 (5th Cir. 1983), a non-exhaustive list of three factors to 
aid in distinguishing between the occurrence of isolated acts 
of discrimination and a persistent, ongoing pattern.  In 
particular, our opinions in West v. Philadelphia Electrical 
Co., 45 F.3d 744 (3d Cir. 1995), and Rush v. Scott Specialty 
Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476 (3d Cir. 1997), contained dicta 
explaining that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
the subject matter,2 frequency, and degree of permanence3 of 
the underlying acts to distinguish continuing violations from 
isolated occurrences.4
                                              
 2We have defined subject matter as whether the 
violations constitute the same type of discrimination.  
  See West, 45 F.3d at 755 n.9 
(discussing Berry, 715 F.2d at 981); see also Rush v. Scott 
Specialty Gases, Inc., 113 F.3d 476, 481-82 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(same).  Citing West, the District Court applied the Berry 
factors and determined that Mandel’s claims met the subject 
  3 We have defined permanence as whether the nature 
of the violations should trigger the employee’s awareness of 
the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of 
the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing 
intent to discriminate. 
 4 We note that Mandel conceded on appeal that this 
three-factor analysis applies, but we find persuasive the 
EEOC’s argument to the contrary and write to clarify the 
continuing violation doctrine following Morgan.   
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matter and frequency requirements but failed the permanency 
requirement because Mandel should have been aware of the 
need to assert her rights but “did not pursue her claim with 
reasonable diligence, and thus she is precluded from using the 
continuing violation theory.”     
 
Following Morgan, however, permanency is not 
required to establish a continuing violation:   
 
It is precisely because the entire 
hostile work environment 
encompasses a single unlawful 
employment practice that we do 
not hold, as have some of the 
Circuits, that the plaintiff may not 
base a suit on individual acts that 
occurred outside the statute of 
limitations unless it would have 
been unreasonable to expect the 
plaintiff to sue before the statute 
ran on such conduct.  The statute 
does not separate individual acts 
that are part of the hostile 
environment claim from the 
whole for the purposes of timely 
filing and liability.  And the 
statute does not contain a 
requirement that the employee file 
a charge prior to 180 or 300 days 
‘after’ the single unlawful practice 
‘occurred.’  Given, therefore, that 
the incidents constituting a hostile 
work environment are part of one 
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unlawful employment practice, 
the employer may be liable for all 
acts that are part of this single 
claim.  In order for the charge to 
be timely, the employee need only 
file a charge within 180 or 300 
days of any act that is part of the 
hostile work environment. 
 
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117-18.  It is clear that there is no longer 
a permanency requirement under the continuing violation 
doctrine and that the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan 
thus supersedes our opinions in West and Rush to the extent 
that we adopted Berry.      
     
 Having clarified our continuing violation doctrine 
following Morgan, we find that Mandel may proceed under a 
continuing violation theory.  Mandel has alleged at least one 
act that falls within the statute of limitations (i.e. Bachert 
calling her a “bitch” during a meeting), and many of the acts 
that occurred prior to the applicable limitations period 
involved similar conduct by the same individuals, suggesting 
a persistent, ongoing pattern.  We will, therefore, remand the 
case to the District Court for further proceedings, including a 
determination of the scope of the incidents properly 
considered part of the continuing violation for the hostile 
work environment claim. 
 
 Furthermore, to address the concern that a plaintiff 
might “unreasonably” delay filing a charge, Morgan 
explained that employers would have recourse, including 
equitable defenses such as laches.  Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121-
22.  M&Q raised the doctrine of laches as a defense, but the 
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District Court did not consider it.  In light of our clarified 
doctrine, M&Q should be given an opportunity to argue the 
laches defense, and the District Court should consider 
whether it applies.    
 
   b.  Hostile Work Environment  
 Title VII prohibits sexual harassment that is 
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the 
plaintiff’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”  Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 67 (1986).  To succeed on a hostile work environment 
claim, the plaintiff must establish that 1) the employee 
suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex, 2) 
the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the 
discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the 
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person 
in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat 
superior liability.  Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d 
Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).  The first four 
elements establish a hostile work environment, and the fifth 
element determines employer liability.  Huston v. Procter & 
Gamble Paper Prods. Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 
2009).     
 
 As a threshold matter, the District Court must 
reexamine the scope of the incidents that are part of the 
continuing violation before the hostile work environment 
claim may be evaluated.  We will, therefore, reverse the grant 
of summary judgment on the hostile work environment claim 
and remand for further proceedings.  In doing so, we briefly 
address two evidentiary concerns and several of the elements 
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of the hostile work environment claim that were heavily 
contested on appeal.  We also note that the parties do not 
dispute the District Court’s finding that Mandel satisfied the 
first element because she had presented “sufficient evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could infer that the alleged 
harassment was based on her sex.”     
 
i.  Scope of Evidence 
   First, so-called “me too” evidence in an employment 
discrimination case is neither per se admissible nor per se 
inadmissible.  Spring/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 
U.S. 379, 388 (2008).  Rather, the question of whether 
evidence of discrimination against other employees by other 
supervisors is relevant is fact based and depends on several 
factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the 
plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.  Id.  We 
“afford broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary 
rulings.”  Id. at 384.  We find that the District Court properly 
excluded the so-called “me too” evidence, which consisted of 
the deposition testimony of two former employees of M&Q 
Plastic Products, Inc., because the two employees were not 
employed by defendant M&Q Packaging but by defendant’s 
parent corporation.   
 
  Second, the EEOC argues that the District Court erred 
by disregarding three specific instances of harassment that 
Mandel listed in her signed Charge but did not testify to in 
her deposition because the Charge is a sworn statement, 
signed under the penalty of perjury, and thus should be 
regarded as more than “bare assertions” or “conclusory 
allegations.”  Because an affidavit attached to a signed EEOC 
charge may raise genuine issues of material fact, see Liotta v. 
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Nat’l Forge Co., 629 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1980), the 
District Court erred in excluding those incidents.  On remand, 
the District Court should consider whether those three 
incidents are part of the continuing violation.    
 
ii.  “Severe or Pervasive” 
To determine whether an environment is hostile, a 
court must consider the totality of the circumstances, 
including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, 
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”  Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); see also Caver v. 
City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] 
discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual 
incidents, but on the overall scenario.”).  The District Court 
summarized the alleged incidents and concluded that “none of 
the alleged incidents is sufficiently severe to establish a 
hostile work environment.”  The District Court’s reasoning 
suggests that it improperly parsed out each event and viewed 
them separately, rather than as a whole.  On remand, the 
District Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, 
rather than parse out the individual incidents, to determine 
whether the acts that collectively form the continuing 
violation are severe or pervasive.      
        
iii.  “Detrimentally Affected” 
We agree with the District Court that an objectively 
reasonable person in Mandel’s place might be offended by the 
alleged incidents.  We are troubled, however, by the District 
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Court’s conclusion that Mandel failed to show that she was 
detrimentally affected by the alleged incidents:   
 
Here, Mandel only complained 
about one of the alleged incidents 
(Bachert’s name calling), and she 
complained to a friend at work 
and not a supervisor.  Further, she 
has presented no evidence that she 
had any psychological distress or 
that her ability to perform her job 
was impaired.  Finally, the record 
contains evidence that Mandel 
actively participated in creating a 
work environment in which 
vulgarity and sexual innuendo 
were commonplace.  Mandel’s 
use of explicit language and her e-
mails involving ongoing sexual 
jokes demonstrate a casual ease 
with this type of workplace 
behavior.  The use of sexual 
humor does not on its own 
demonstrate that Mandel is 
incapable of being offended by 
degrading comments, but when 
combined with a lack of evidence 
of any subjective distress, a 
reasonable jury could not find that 
Mandel has proven that the 
harassment had a detrimental 
effect on her.   
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 Although Mandel engaged in certain unprofessional 
conduct, the comments and conduct to which she was subject 
were often worse and apparently uninvited.  Mandel 
complained about being told to make coffee, and although she 
did not complain to her supervisors about the other alleged 
incidents, there is some evidence that she complained to other 
employees.  She also resigned shortly after Bachert called her 
a “bitch” during a meeting and alleged in her sworn EEOC 
Charge and questionnaires that she was detrimentally 
affected.  A jury could reasonably conclude that Mandel did 
not invite these comments or conduct and that, despite her 
own conduct, was offended by them.  Because the inherently 
subjective question of whether particular conduct was 
unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns on 
credibility determinations, the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment. 
 
iv.  Respondeat Superior 
Liability 
The basis of an employer’s liability for a hostile work 
environment claim depends on whether the harasser is the 
victim’s supervisor or coworker.  Huston, 568 F.3d at 104.  
Because the District Court concluded that Mandel failed to 
establish a hostile work environment, it did not reach the 
question of employer liability.  There is an inadequate record 
before us on appeal from which to determine whether 
respondeat superior liability exists.  Because we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings on the hostile work 
environment claim, we leave the issue to the District Court to 
determine on remand.      
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In sum, permanency is not required to show a 
continuing violation following Morgan, and we thus reverse 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the Title 
VII hostile work environment claim (Count II) and remand 
for further proceedings.  
 
   c.  Sex Discrimination 
 To prevail in a sex discrimination claim under Title 
VII, a plaintiff must first establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.  Tex. Dep’t of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).  A 
plaintiff must show that “1) s/he is a member of a protected 
class, 2) s/he was qualified for the position s/he sought to 
attain or retain, 3) s/he suffered an adverse employment 
action, and 4) the action occurred under circumstances that 
could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”  
Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
 The parties do not dispute that Mandel is a member of 
a protected class based on her sex or that she was qualified 
for her position.  Rather, Mandel contends that the District 
Court erred by finding that she was neither constructively 
discharged nor subject to disparate treatment regarding wages 
and career opportunities.  
  
i.  Constructive Discharge  
 Mandel contends that the meeting during which 
Bachert called her a “bitch” caused her to resign, resulting in 
a constructive discharge.  To establish a constructive 
discharge, Mandel must show that “the employer knowingly 
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permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so 
intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would 
resign.”  Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 
1084 (3d Cir. 1996).  We employ an objective test and thus an 
employee’s subjective perceptions of unfairness or harshness 
do not govern a claim of constructive discharge.  Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992).  In 
determining whether an employee was forced to resign, we 
consider a number of factors, including whether the employee 
was threatened with discharge, encouraged to resign, 
demoted, subject to reduced pay or benefits, involuntarily 
transferred to a less desirable position, subject to altered job 
responsibilities, or given unsatisfactory job evaluations.  
Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 503 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
 The District Court concluded that Mandel failed to 
prove a hostile working environment and thus also concluded 
that she necessarily failed to establish a constructive 
discharge claim.  See Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 
F.3d 311, 317 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To prove constructive 
discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or 
pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to 
prove a hostile working environment.”).  Because we will 
reverse the District Court’s decision with respect to the 
hostile work environment claim, its reasoning for the 
constructive discharge claim is no longer sufficient.  On 
remand, the District Court should review the constructive 
discharge claim in light of evidence of a hostile work 
environment to determine if the conditions of Mandel’s 
employment had become intolerable.   
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  ii.  Disparate Treatment 
 Mandel also contends that she received lower wages 
and less vacation time than similarly situated male 
employees, specifically Frank Drozal.  The District Court 
correctly concluded that Mandel failed to raise the necessary 
inference of discrimination because the employees to which 
Mandel compared herself were not similarly situated—in 
particular, Drozal held a different position and had a higher 
level of education.  Although the identification of a similarly 
situated individual outside of the protected class, who 
engaged in the same conduct but was treated more favorably, 
may give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, an 
employee who holds a different job in a different department 
is not similarly situated.  See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 
191 F.3d 344, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1999).  We thus will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the Title VII 
sex discrimination claims (Count I).   
 
III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court with respect to the retaliation 
claims, the PHRA claims, and the Title VII sex discrimination 
claims, but we will reverse the grant of summary judgment 
with respect to the Title VII hostile work environment and the 
constructive discharge claims and remand for further 
proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 
CONCLUSION 
 
